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Abstract
We introduce new techniques for proving lower bounds on the running time of randomized
algorithms for asynchronous agreement against powerful adversaries. In particular, we define
a strongly adaptive adversary that is computationally unbounded and has a limited ability
to corrupt a dynamic subset of processors by erasing their memories. We demonstrate that
the randomized agreement algorithms designed by Ben-Or and Bracha to tolerate crash or
Byzantine failures in the asynchronous setting extend to defeat a strongly adaptive adversary.
These algorithms have essentially perfect correctness and termination, but at the expense of
exponential running time. In the case of the strongly adaptive adversary, we show that this
dismally slow running time is inherent : we prove that any algorithm with essentially perfect
correctness and termination against the strongly adaptive adversary must have exponential
running time. We additionally interpret this result as yielding an enhanced understanding
of the tools needed to simultaneously achieving perfect correctness and termination as well
as fast running time for randomized algorithms tolerating crash or Byzantine failures.
1 Introduction
Achieving agreement in a distributed system despite failures is a central problem in distributed
computing. We consider a complete network of n processors able to communicate with each
other by passing messages. Initially, each processor has an input bit. The task is to design a
failure-resilient protocol that allows all non-faulty processors to agree on an output value, with
the restriction that it must be equal to at least one of their inputs (this rules out the trivial
solution of having a constant decision value independent of the inputs). The difficulty of this
problem depends heavily on several additional specifications that must be made. In particular,
is communication synchronous or asynchronous? What kinds of failures should be tolerated?
If the errors and/or scheduling are controlled by an adversary, what resources and information
does the adversary have access to?
We will consider a very challenging setting of asynchronous communication where message
scheduling is controlled by an adversary with unbounded computational power who is given
unrestricted access to all message contents and internal states of all processors. The adversary
will also be empowered to cause limited types and quantities of processor failures. In this work,
we will consider two kinds of failures: crash failures, which cause a processor to quit without
warning, as well as resetting failures, which we will define and motivate below.
In this setting, the elegant result of Fischer, Lynch, and Paterson [14] shows that it is already
impossible to design a deterministic protocol for agreement that always terminates, even if the
adversary is limited to causing at most one crash failure. A common approach for tolerating
this obstacle in practice is to use an algorithm that terminates as long as worst-case scheduling
does not occur indefinitely. This is a property achieved by the well-known Paxos algorithm
constructed by Lamport [22]. Randomized algorithms provide a potential alternative. Quickly
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following the impossibility result, Ben-Or [7] and Bracha [10] presented randomized algorithms
terminating with probability one, even against such strong adversaries. These algorithms were
intuitively structured, and Bracha’s algorithm tolerated an optimal number of failures, namely
allowing for t processors to behave in an arbitrary malicious fashion, for any t < n
3
. Also,
Aguilera and Toueg [1] have provided a new correctness proof for Ben-Or’s randomized consensus
algorithm when there are < n
2
crash failures. However, for some settings of the initial input
bits, the algorithms of [7, 10] run for time that is exponential in n (with high probability) when
t = Ω(n).
The algorithms in [7, 10] seem to provide even stronger failure resilience than is captured
by the adversarial model employed. In particular, the original proofs of correctness rely only
on the fact that at most t processors are faulty at one time, where the notion of “time” must
be defined in an appropriate (and perhaps subtle) way. This gives some hope for recovering
from even more than t < n
3
failures over the course of long executions if individual processor
faults are fleeting occurrences. In particular, one might suppose that faulty processors could be
detected and fixed during the course of a protocol execution, thereby allowing for more total
failures.
In order to more fully characterize the failure resilience provided by the basic algorithm
underlying [7, 10], we define the notion of resetting failures. A resetting failure at a processor
results in loss of internal state: a processor that is reset is assumed to lose the entire contents
of its memory (except for its initial input bit and its output bit). A resetting failure can model
a processor that is detected to be faulty and has its memory reset in order for it to rejoin the
protocol as a non-faulty processor. We define a strongly adaptive adversary who can cause up
to t resetting failures in a certain window of time, where our measure of time is appropriately
linked to the events of the execution. (Some kind of linking is necessary to avoid allowing the
adversary to always cause a failure at the processor currently taking a step in the execution,
for example.)
We prove that a simple variant of the algorithms in [7, 10] is indeed successful against such
a strongly adaptive adversary (with probability one). Of course, this retains the exponentially
slow running time. We then show that exponential slowness for t = Ω(n) is inherent to any
algorithm achieving success with probability one against this strongly adaptive adversary. This
provides a rather complete understanding of what is achievable in the presence of adaptive
resetting faults.
In contrast, the relatively recent algorithm of Kapron et. al. [16] runs very quickly (poly-
logarithmic time in n) and tolerates t <
(
1
3
− ǫ) non-adaptive Byzantine failures, but incurs a
non-zero probability of non-termination or termination with invalid outputs. It is an interesting
question to study to what extent the sacrifices made here (non-adaptivity, non-zero probability
of incorrect output) are necessary to achieve fast running time. The algorithm in [16] works
by iteratively dividing the processors into small “committees” that can afford to run the slow
algorithm of [10] to hold elections to select random smaller subsets of processors to continue into
new committees. A single final committee is reached that, with 1 − o(1) probability, contains
a suitably bounded percentage of faulty processors. This final committee runs the algorithm of
[10] and informs the other processors of the result.
It is clear that this approach cannot be used against an adaptive adversary, who can simply
wait for the final committee to be determined and then cause faults. This approach also seems
to inherently incur non-zero probability of an invalid result, as there is always a nonzero chance
that the final committee is composed entirely of faulty processors. With the goal of beginning
a systematic study of what can be achieved without incurring these disadvantages, Lewko [24]
previously proved that a class of algorithms generalizing Ben-Or and Bracha’s algorithms in
[7, 10] cannot achieve subexponential running time against an adversary causing t = Ω(n) non-
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adaptive Byzantine failures. The class of algorithms was restricted in several ways, including
a constant bound on the support size of all message distributions sampled by processors and a
requirement for received messages from different processors to be treated symmetrically. (For
a more detailed description of the algorithm class, see [24].)
The techniques we introduce to prove the lower bound against strongly adaptive adversaries
can be applied in this setting to yield an exponential lower bound on running time for a new
class of algorithms tolerating t = Ω(n) crash failures. This class is incomparable to the class
considered in [24], and this result yields several new insights. Most notably, our lower bound
technique can tolerate arbitrary use of randomness by the processors, allowing us to avoid
requiring any restriction on the support size as in [24]. We also avoid any requirement of
symmetry in how received messages are treated, and our class is more intuitively defined.
Concurrently with this work, King and Saia [19] have discovered a Las Vegas polynomial-
time algorithm tolerating adaptive Byzantine faults that falls outside the classes of algorithms
considered here and in [24]. This implies a separation between what can achieved against the
classical adaptive Byzantine adversary and the strongly adaptive adversary.
Our Techniques To prove the exponential lower bound on running time, we rely crucially
on a general probabilistic inequality of Talagrand [28], which roughly states that any product
distribution Ω1×Ω2× . . .×Ωn cannot put too much weight simultaneously on two sets A and B
in n-dimensional space that are “far apart.” For our purposes, “far apart” can be interpreted as
having Hamming distance Ω(n). We also can interpolate this result: if some product distribution
Ω1 × . . .× Ωn puts significant weight on A and some other product distribution Π1 × . . .×Πn
puts significant weight on B, then there is some mixed product distribution Ω1 × . . . × Ωi ×
Πi+1 × . . .×Πn that puts small weight on each of A and B.
To use these tools in order to prove a lower bound on running time, we define iterative pairs
of sets in the joint state space of the n processors that represent different levels of progress
towards a final decision. By leveraging the capabilities of the strongly adaptive adversary (or
later by leveraging the defining properties of the algorithm class), we prove that each of these
pairs of sets is sufficiently separated in Hamming distance. We then apply the probabilistic
inequalities repeatedly as an execution travels through the state space of the n processors,
showing that for some initial setting of the inputs, the adversary can prevent the algorithm
from making much progress in a given window of time with high probability. This ultimately
yields our lower bound.
Our approach of leveraging general properties of product distributions in this iterative fash-
ion represents a meaningful expansion of the suite of available tools for proving lower bounds in
a distributed setting. In particular, there are essentially only a few core tools for proving lower
bounds for randomized algorithms, and previous approaches do not achieve exponential lower
bounds on running time when arbitrary amounts of randomness can be used. We consider our
new techniques to be the main contribution of this work. In the following subsection, we briefly
survey prior lower bounds and other relevant work.
1.1 Related Work
The problem of reaching agreement despite faults was introduced by Pease, Shostak, and Lam-
port in [26], who also proposed the Byzantine failure model in [23]. Since its introduction, the
problem of fault-tolerant agreement has been widely studied in a variety of models. Several
works have considered computationally bounded adversaries, a setting in which cryptographic
tools can be employed ([27, 29, 9, 12, 11, 25], for example). In the synchronous communi-
cation setting, polylogarithmic round randomized protocols for Byzantine agreement against
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non-adaptive adversaries were obtained in [20, 21, 8, 15]. Recent work has focused on reducing
the communication overhead of synchronous protocols [17, 18].
Several lower bounds are also known. In addition to the impossibility of deterministic
algorithms in the asynchronous setting mentioned above, there is a sharp lower bound of t
rounds for deterministic algorithms in the synchronous setting [13]. This lower bound is proven
by assembling a chain of executions where any two adjacent executions are indistinguishable to
some non-faulty processor and the two ends of the chain represent different decision values. This
basic strategy is adapted and expanded in [24] to yield a lower bound for a class of randomized
algorithms, but this class inherently limits the amount of randomness used in choosing an
individual message.
Polynomial lower bounds for randomized algorithms include the result of Bar-Joseph and
Ben-Or [6], which proves a lower bound of t/
√
n log n on the number of expected rounds for
a randomized synchronous protocol against an adversary who can adaptively choose to fail t
processors. Interestingly, their proof employs Schectman’s theorem to analyze one-round coin
flipping games, similar to our core use of Talagrand’s inequality. However, they employ different
techniques to build their analysis of multiple rounds. Another lower bound is due to Attiya
and Censor [4], who show that for any integer k, the probability that a randomized Byzantine
agreement algorithm does not terminate in k(n − t) steps is at least 1/ck for some constant c.
Their technique involves constructing a chain of indistinguishable executions and bounding the
termination probability in terms of the length of the chain. Aspnes [3] proves a lower bound
of Ω(t/ log2 t) on the expected number of local coin flips for asynchronous algorithms against
adaptive adversaries that holds in either the shared memory or message passing model. This
result is proven by establishing an extension of the techniques in [14] to a randomized setting.
In the shared memory model, there are polynomial time randomized algorithms tolerating crash
failures, and tight bounds on their total step complexity are proven by Attiya and Censor in
[5]. This work also uses an analysis of product probability spaces, similarly to the proof in [6].
2 Models and Definitions
We let n denote the total number of processors, and consider each processor to be endowed
with a unique identity between 1 and n. We let 0 < t < n be a fixed positive integer (we
let t be arbitrary for the purposes of definition, but note that in our theorems below, we will
take t = cn for a suitably small positive constant c). We assume that each processor has
its own source of random bits, and all of these sources are unbiased and independent. Each
processor also has a fixed input bit, and a write-once output bit that is initially set to ⊥. We
work in a message-passing model, where any single processor can send a message to any other
processor along a dedicated “message channel,” meaning that the recipient of a message will
always correctly identify the sender. We let M denote the space of all possible messages (this
can be infinite). An element m ∈M contains a sender identity, a receiver identity, and a string
of bits interpreted as its contents.
We define the state of a processor to include the current contents of its memory (note that
this holds its identity, its input bit, and its output bit with current value 0, 1, or ⊥). We let Σ
denote the set of possible processor states. An n-tuple of states, σ ∈ Σn specifies a configuration
for the n processors.
An algorithm A is a collection of probability distributions on Σ ×Mn, parameterized by
Σ×M. In other words, an algorithm specifies how a processor should sample a new state and
outgoing messages, depending on the current state as well as a just received message. The new
state may contain updated memory contents (the output bit may or may not change). The new
sent messages can depend on the freshly received message, the current memory of the processor,
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and freshly sampled random bits. We include ∅ ∈ M to allow a processor to choose not to send
a message.
We will adopt the usual notion of asynchrony and imagine that message delivery is con-
trolled by an adversary. We will allow our adversary complete access to the current states of
all the processors and the contents of all messages. We also allow our adversary unbounded
computational power.
It is typical to define an execution as a sequence of steps, where each step consists of
a processor (potentially) receiving a message, performing some local computation, and then
possibly placing some outgoing messages into a “message buffer.” The adversary then controls
the sequence of steps by deciding which processor will take the next step and what message (if
any) that processor will receive.
To model an adversary able to crash up to t processors, one can insist that in any infinite
execution, all but at most t processors take infinitely many steps and that every message sent
to an infinitely stepping processor is eventually delivered. It is also common to consider a
stronger Byzantine adversary, who instead has the power to corrupt the messages sent by up to
t processors. In this setting, we may require all processors to take infinitely many steps - but
note that corrupted processors may simulate crashed processors by maliciously choosing not to
send messages (changing a non-empty message m to ∅ is considered a permissible corruption
by the adversary). We note that corruption of messages allows an adversary to lie about the
random coins sampled by a limited number of processors.
We will instead define a adversary who is able to “reset” a changing set of ≤ t processors.
Resetting a processor will correspond to erasing the contents of its memory, except for its input
bit, its output bit, its processor identity, and a special counter that will increment each time a
reset occurs. We assume that a processor keeps a local copy of the counter’s value in its state,
and hence will detect a reset when the local copy is erased and the real counter is non-zero. This
mechanism of detection is just a book-keeping device, the key point is that we are assuming
resets are events processors can internally detect (note that this strengthens our lower bound
result).
We now consider executions expressed as sequences of more fine-grained steps between con-
figurations, where we allow three distinct types of steps. A resetting step will cause the memory
of a specified processor to be reset. A receiving step will deliver a message from the message
buffer to its intended recipient. The recipient will then perform a local computation (perhaps
sampling from some fresh local randomness). This will be the only kind of step that involves
randomization.
Finally, a sending step will allow a processor to place a set of new messages into the message
buffer (this set may be empty if the processor chooses not to send anything). We assume
that a single sending step represents a complete response to prior events, meaning that if a
processor takes a sending step and then takes another sending step without taking any resetting
or receiving steps in between, then the second sending step will have no effect - the state of the
processor will remain unchanged and no new messages will be sent. The adversary will control
the order and nature of the steps.
Given a partial execution expressed as a finite sequence of such steps, we define its probability
(with respect to a fixed algorithm A) to be the product of the probabilities of each state change
induced by a step, under the distributions specified by the algorithm. (This is assuming the
initial configuration is valid.) Note that this will be zero if deterministic transitions are not
followed, or if a step indicates delivery of a message that was never sent, etc.
Naturally, it would be impossible to make progress against an adversary allowed to reset
processors arbitrarily. In particular, we must design a model that rules out the trivial case of an
adversary that resets the memory of the receiving processor after every message delivery, as no
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algorithm can make progress under such adverse circumstances. To ensure feasibility, we could
limit the adversary to resetting at most t processors throughout an execution. However, we can
achieve success against even stronger adversaries. To specify an interesting such adversary, we
make one key definition:
Definition 1. An acceptable window is a consecutive segment of steps of the following form.
First, all n processors take sending steps. Then, for sets S1, S2, . . . , Sn ⊆ [n] all of size ≥ n− t,
a sequence of receiving steps follows that delivers to each processor i the messages just sent to
it from processors in the set Si. Finally, a sequence of at most t resetting steps occurs.
The notion of an acceptable window is a formal unit of “time” during an execution in which
at most t processors are faulty, and hence the other processors may not receive any messages
from them. One could imagine adding a requirement that i ∈ Si for each i, as a processor can
always safely wait to receive a message from itself, but this is unnecessary, as no resets occur
between sending and receiving. This means that any information the processor could pass to
itself through a message can instead be stored directly in the processor’s state. Thus, adding a
requirement that i ∈ Si would be superfluous here.
We define the Strongly Adaptive Adversary to be an adversary allowed to reset processors
and control message sending and receiving up to the constraint that any infinite execution is
composed entirely of adjacent, disjoint acceptable windows. We observe that this adversary is
incomparable to the usual Byzantine asynchronous adversary. Our strongly adaptive adversary
has the additional power to erase processor memory, but it lacks the power to have corrupted
processors “lie” about their local random bits.
Our use of the phrase “the strongly adaptive adversary” is a bit imprecise, since this tech-
nically constitutes a class of adversaries in the following sense. A single adversary should be
thought of as a deterministic function that maps a partial execution to a next applicable step.
Such a function need not be efficiently computable. We will consider the class of strongly adap-
tive adversaries to be the collection of individual adversaries that satisfy the requirement above
to produce acceptable windows.
It may seem a bit unnatural to impose the constraint that an adversary should stick to
acceptable windows, but we feel this captures the intuitive notion that the adversary should only
corrupt t processors “at one time,” as otherwise progress would be impossible. Furthermore, as
our main result in this model is a lower bound, placing restrictions on the adversary strengthens
our result.
We call a configuration reachable if it occurs as the consequence of some partial execution
with non-zero probability that is decomposable as a concatenation of acceptable windows. Note
that the notion of reachability depends on the algorithm employed.
Definition 2. We say an algorithm A achieves measure one correctness against all strongly
adaptive adversaries if any reachable configuration contains only agreeing or ⊥ output bits, (in
other words, one output bit being 0 and another being 1 is disallowed, but any assortment of 0’s
and ⊥’s or any assortment of 1’s and ⊥’s is allowed). We also require that when an output is
not ⊥, it must agree with one of the inputs. This means that if all processors have inputs equal
to 0, the decision cannot be 1, and vice versa.
Definition 3. We say an algorithm A achieves measure one termination if any infinite
execution (composed of acceptable windows) in which some processor taking an infinite sequence
of sending and receiving steps never sets its decision bit has probability zero (we define the prob-
ability of an infinite execution to be the limit of the probabilities of its finite partial executions).
In an asynchronous setting, defining the running time of an execution can be a bit subtle.
One typical measure is to consider the length of the longest message chain before a decision is
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reached, where a message chain includes messages m1,m2, . . . ,mk such that mi is received by
the sender of mi+1, at some point prior to the sending of mi+1. It is not immediately clear how a
“message chain” should be defined in the presence of resetting faults: should a message sent after
a reset be counted as continuing a chain of messages received before the reset? Since our strongly
adaptive adversary is constrained to keep to schedules that are approximately synchronous, we
will employ a more obvious measure, namely the number of acceptable windows that pass before
the first processor decides. When we later reformulate our techniques to obtain a lower bound
for a class of algorithms in the presence of crash failures, we will define the running time of an
execution as the length of the longest message chain preceding a decision.
3 Feasibility Against the Strongly Adaptive Adversary
Both Ben-Or [7] and Bracha [10] provide expected exponential time algorithms for Byzantine
agreement against a full-information asynchronous adversary (terminating and succeeding with
probability 1). Bracha’s algorithm introduces a bit more complexity in order to achieve the
optimal resilience of t < n
3
in the Byzantine setting.
Inspired by these algorithms, we provide a close variant that succeeds against the strongly
adaptive adversary. We will not be concerned with obtaining the optimal resilience, and so
will favor simplicity of presentation over possible improvements to the constant fraction of
resets allowed per acceptable window. The algorithm is parameterized by several thresholds,
T1 ≥ T2 ≥ T3, and we will discuss appropriate settings of these below.
Throughout the algorithm, each processor p will store its input bit, its (write-once) output
bit, and a few additional variables. The variable rp will hold the current “round number” and
is initialized to 1. The variable xp is initialized to be equal to the input bit of processor p.
step 1: Send the message (rp, xp) to all processors.
step 2: Wait until T1 messages of type (rq, xq) have arrived from other processors with values
of rq = rp.
step 3: If at least T2 of these T1 messages have the same bit value v for the last entry, then
write v to the output bit (assuming this bit is not yet written). If at least T3 of these T1
messages have the same bit v, then set xp = v. Otherwise, set xp to be a freshly sampled
uniformly random bit.
step 4: Set rp = rp + 1 and return to step 1.
handling resets To address resets, a processor p also does the following. If p has just been
reset (an event that is detectable), then processor p waits to receive at least T1 messages (rq, xq)
from other processors with a common value of r. It then sets its own rp value to the match this
and returns to step 3 above (note that a newly reset processor refrains from sending messages
until it resumes normal operation).
We note that 2T3 > T1 should hold in order for the behavior in step 3 to be clear. This is a
constraint we will always impose.
Theorem 4. The above algorithm achieves measure one correctness and termination against
the strongly adaptive adversary for t < n
6
when the thresholds T1, T2, T3 are set to satisfy n−2t ≥
T1 ≥ T2 ≥ T3 + t, and 2T3 > n.
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Proof. We note that whenever t < n
6
, the constraints on the thresholds T1, T2, T3 specified above
are achievable by setting T1 := n− 2t, T2 = T1, T3 = n− 3t. (Having a smaller value of t allows
one to set T2 smaller than T1, which will lead to improvement in running time but is not relevant
for measure one correctness and termination.)
We first establish measure one correctness. Suppose that σ is a reachable configuration
in which some processor has decided. We consider a non-zero probability partial execution
composed of acceptable windows leading to σ (such a partial execution must exist by definition
of reachability). Now, we let w denote the earliest acceptable window in which a decision is
made, and we let p denote a processor deciding in window w. In order to decide on a bit v,
p must have received ≥ T2 messages of the form (r, v) for its current value of rp. Each other
processor q must have received ≥ T2 − t of these messages (r, v) during the receiving steps in
window w.
We now consider how the internal round numbers r maintained by the processors evolve
during a sequence of acceptable windows. Initially, all round numbers are 1. Assuming that
n − t ≥ T1, all processors will increment r to be 2 during the first acceptable window. Thus,
entering the second acceptable window, all processors that were not reset during the first window
will have r = 2, and the reset processors will have blank r values (denoted by ⊥). During the
second acceptable window, each processor will receive at least n− 2t messages from processors
with r values equal to 2. Assuming that T1 ≤ n−2t, every processor will then have r = 3 before
the resetting steps.
Extending this reasoning inductively, we see that in window w, at least n− t processors will
enter the window with r = w (with the rest having r = ⊥). Again assuming that T1 ≤ n − 2t
and additionally assuming that T2− t ≥ T3, every processor will have xq = v and r = w+1 just
before the resetting steps that conclude window w. It follows that every processor who has not
yet decided will decide v in window w + 1. We must also check that it is impossible for some
processor to decide the opposite of v during window w. This is impossible as long as 2T2 > n.
We have thus shown that it is impossible to obtain contradicting decision values in a reach-
able configuration. To see that decision values conflicting with a unanimous setting of the inputs
are also impossible, note that if all inputs are equal to a common value v, then all processors will
decide v in the first acceptable window. This completes our proof of measure one correctness.
To establish measure one termination, we first argue that during any given acceptable win-
dow, no two processors p and q can fix xp and xq deterministically to conflicting values. If p
deterministically sets xp to v, this means it received ≥ T3 messages with the value v. Processor
q could not have received ≥ T3 messages with the opposite value if we impose the constraint
that 2T3 > n. Assuming this constraint, no two processors can deterministically set conflicting
values. Thus, there is at least a 2−n probability that all processors p set the same value for xp
during any given window. Thus, the probability of not deciding approaches 0 as the number of
acceptable windows approaches infinity. This implies measure one termination.
We observe that for any constant c < 1
6
, setting t = cn makes measure one correctness and
termination attainable through the above algorithm, but the algorithm will incur exponential
running time (with high probability) against an adversary that chooses initial inputs evenly
split between 0 and 1. To see this, note that T3 will always need to be >
1
2
n, and hence T2 will
always need to be > (1
2
+ c)n. Decision will then be contingent on obtaining a strong majority
that occurs with probability that is exponentially small (depending on c). This is a consequence
of the simple fact that with high probability, a sampling of n independent uniformly random
bits will yield a deviation of only O(n 12+ǫ) from the mean (for any small ǫ > 0). Hence, with
high probability per round, the adversary can continually extend the execution to last one
more round without deciding by showing every processor an approximate split between 0 and
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1 messages, and then having all of them set their next bits randomly in step 3. We expect this
to continue for an exponential number of rounds until a strong enough majority happens by
chance to prevent the adversary from continuing in this fashion.
4 Impossibility of Expected Polynomial Time Against the Strongly
Adaptive Adversary
Here we establish our main result: an exponential lower bound on the running time for any
algorithm achieving measure one correctness and termination against the strongly adaptive
adversary.
Theorem 5. We set t = cn where c > 0 is any fixed positive constant. Then there exist absolute
positive constants C,α (depending only on c) such that, for any algorithm achieving measure
one correctness and termination, there is a strongly adaptive adversary and a setting of the
inputs bits such that with probability ≥ 1
2
, the running time is ≥ Ceαn.
We first give a high-level outline of our proof. As a base case, we observe that the reachable
configurations corresponding to a decision of 0 and the reachable configurations corresponding
to a decision of 1 form two sets (denoted Z00 and Z
0
1 ) that are significantly separated in Hamming
distance. Intuitively, if conflicting decision states were too close, then the differing processors
could be temporarily silenced, and the other processors could be forced to make a decision that
could conflict. By interpolating over the input possibilities and applying Talagrand’s inequality,
we could use this base observation to prove that there is a setting of the inputs such that
reaching a decision in just one “round” of communication is very unlikely.
To work up to analyzing many rounds, we inductively build pairs of sets Zk0 and Z
k
1 of
configurations further out from decisions. These pairs of sets will remain Hamming-separated
and will be designed so that if a configuration is not in Zk0 , say, then the adversary will have a
good chance of continuing the execution for k more rounds without a decision of 0 occurring. We
define Zk0 such that if we start from a configuration in Z
k
0 and apply certain acceptable windows,
then there is always a sufficient chance of landing in Zk−1
0
. We define Zk1 analogously. To show
that Zk0 and Z
k
1 are still significantly separated in Hamming distance, we argue that if they
were too close, this would imply the existence of a single product distribution placing too much
weight simultaneously on Zk−1
0
and Zk−1
1
. Since these are assumed to be Hamming-separated
by the inductive hypothesis, this would contradict Talagrand’s inequality.
We then show that as long as one avoids the union of the sets Zk0 and Z
k
1 , then there is an
acceptable window that can be used to extend the execution to a state avoiding Zk−1
0
∪ Zk−1
1
with high probability. This is essentially an interpolation argument: since we know there is a
choice of window that avoids Zk−1
0
and another that avoids Zk−1
1
, we can interpolate to obtain
a single choice of extending window that avoids the union. Finally, we show that if one begins
outside of Zk0 ∪Zk1 , then one can extend the execution for k steps without a decision occurring
with constant probability for a value of k that is exponential in n.
To prove this theorem formally, we develop some key lemmas and definitions in the next
subsections.
4.1 A Probabilistic Lemma
We will crucially rely on Talagrand’s inequality, a very general tool for studying product mea-
sures. We will state a consequence of it here in the context of Hamming distance, as we will
not need the additional generality provided by the full statement. A fuller statement and proof
can be found in [2], for example.
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We first develop some convenient notation. We let Ω =
∏n
i=1Ωi, where each Ωi is a prob-
ability space and Ω is endowed with the product measure. We employ the usual notion of
Hamming distance between points in Ω: for x = (x1, . . . , xn) and y = (y1, . . . , yn) ∈ Ω, we
define ∆(x, y) to the number of coordinates i such that xi 6= yi. Given a set A ⊆ Ω and a point
x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Ω, we define the Hamming distance ∆(x,A) between the point x and the set
A to be the minimal Hamming distance attained between x and a point a ∈ A:
Definition 6. For A ⊆ Ω and x ∈ Ω,
∆(x,A) := min{∆(x, a) : a ∈ A}.
Similarly, we define the Hamming distance between two sets A,B ⊆ Ω to be the minimal
Hamming distance attained between a point a ∈ A and a point b ∈ B:
Definition 7. For A,B ⊆ Ω,
∆(A,B) := min{∆(a, b) : a ∈ A, b ∈ B}.
Finally, given a set A ⊆ Ω and a non-negative real number d, we define the set B(A, d) to
be the subset of points in Ω which are at a Hamming distance of at most d from A:
Definition 8. For A ⊆ Ω and d ≥ 0,
B(A, d) := {x ∈ Ω : ∆(x,A) ≤ d}.
We are now prepared to state the required consequence of Talagrand’s inequality (see [2],
for example):
Lemma 9. For any A ⊆ Ω and any d ≥ 0,
P[A](1− P[B(A, d)]) ≤ e− d
2
4n .
4.2 The Building Blocks of the Proof
We now recursively define two sequences of subsets of Σn that will form the building blocks of
our proof of Theorem 5. These definitions will be made with respect to a fixed algorithm A
and a threshold parameter τ > 0 that we will set later. Our base sets are defined as follows:
Definition 10. We let Z00 denote the set of reachable configurations in Σ
n such that at least
one processor has written 0 to its output bit. Similarly, we let Z01 denote the set of reachable
configurations in Σn such that at least one processor has written 1 to its output bit.
Lemma 11. If the algorithm A satisfies measure one correctness and measure one termination,
then ∆
(
Z00 , Z
0
1
)
> t.
Proof. We suppose not. Then there exist reachable configurations σ, γ ∈ Σn such that σ ∈ Z00 ,
γ ∈ Z01 , and ∆(σ, γ) ≤ t. Without loss of generality, we suppose that σ and γ only differ in the
first t coordinates (i.e. only in the local states of processors 1 through t). Consider a non-zero
probability partial execution composed of acceptable windows that results in configuration σ.
The adversary can continue such an execution by always delivering the messages from the last
n− t processors. This will allow an arbitrarily long sequence of new acceptable windows.
Since the algorithm A satisfies measure one termination, if the adversary keeps extending
this execution by appending new acceptable windows, with probability one a decision must
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eventually be reached, and since σ ∈ Z00 , this decision must be 0 (with probability one). How-
ever, we can apply the same argument to a partial execution reaching γ and then similarly
delivering messages only from the last n − t processors. Since the distribution of the states of
the last n − t processors is the same in both cases, it must be that their decision is also the
same. Since γ ∈ Z01 , this contradicts measure one correctness.
Given sets R,S1, . . . , Sn ⊆ [n] satisfying |R| ≤ t, |Si| ≥ n−t ∀i, we say the strongly adaptive
adversary can apply this set to a reachable configuration σ ∈ Σn, meaning that the adversary
can execute sending steps for all processors, deliver to each processor i the messages sent to
it by senders in Si, in some fixed order, and then reset the processors in R. Note that the
application of sets R,S1, . . . , Sn with the specified properties results in an acceptable window
(by definition).
Once we have defined sets Zk−1
0
and Zk−1
1
for some positive integer k, we define the next
sets Zk0 and Z
k
1 as follows:
Definition 12. We let Zk0 denote the set of reachable configurations in Σ
n such that, for any
sets R, S such that |R| ≤ t, |S| ≥ n−t, the adversary applying R,S, S, . . . , S to the configuration
will result in a new configuration that belongs to Zk−1
0
with probability > τ . Similarly, we let
Zk1 denote the set of reachable configurations in Σ
n such that, for such R and S, the adversary
applying R,S, S, . . . , S to the configuration will result in a new configuration that belongs to
Zk−1
1
with probability > τ .
Lemma 13. If the algorithm A satisfies measure one correctness and termination and τ ≥ e− t
2
8n ,
then ∆
(
Zk0 , Z
k
1
)
> t for all non-negative integers k.
Proof. We proceed by induction on k. The base case k = 0 is addressed above in Lemma 11.
We assume the result holds for k − 1 ≥ 0, and we suppose it is false for k. Then there exist
reachable configurations σ, γ ∈ Σn such that σ ∈ Zk0 , γ ∈ Zk1 , and ∆(σ, γ) ≤ t. Without loss of
generality, we suppose that σ and γ only differ in the first t coordinates. We let R denote the
set {1, 2, . . . , t} and S denote the set {t+ 1, t+ 2, . . . , n}. By definition of Zk0 , if the adversary
applies R,S, . . . , S to σ, this will with probability > τ result in a new configuration belonging
to Zk−1
0
. Similarly, if the adversary applies R,S, . . . , S to γ, this will with probability > τ result
in a new configuration belonging to Zk−1
1
.
We first suppose that both σ and γ are configurations in which no decisions have occurred.
In other words, no processors have yet written to their output bits. Assuming this, the resets
will obliterate the differences between the first t processor states. Hence the distribution of
the resulting configuration is identical in these two cases, as it is independent of the prior
contents of the memories of the reset processors, as these have been erased (and their messages
went undelivered). Since local randomness is sampled independently by each processor only in
response to the message receipts in the window, which occur after the deterministic sending
steps, the distribution on the resulting configuration (which is reachable with probability one)
is in fact a product distribution. This distribution places weight > τ on each of two sets, Zk−1
0
and Zk−1
1
, that are separated by a Hamming distance > t. Applying Lemma 9, we thus have
that
τ2 < e−
t2
4n ⇔ τ < e− t
2
8n .
This contradicts our stipulation on the value of τ .
We finally consider the case where some decision has already been made in σ. Since σ ∈ Zk0 ,
this decision must be 0. However, repeatedly applying acceptable windows of R,S, . . . , S to σ
must result in a decision of 1 with nonzero probability, since γ ∈ Zk1 , and the distribution of
the final n − t states here is independent of the output bits of the first t processors, as their
messages are never delivered. This contradicts measure one correctness.
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We now prove that if a reachable configuration is not in Zk0 or Z
k
1 , then the adversary can
choose the next acceptable window in a way that will (with high probability) avoid landing
in Zk−1
0
∪ Zk−1
1
. The intuition for this can be developed as follows. We know that there is a
product distribution induced by an acceptable window that places low probability on Zk−1
0
, and
we know there is a (potentially different) product distribution induced by an acceptable window
that places low probability on Zk−1
1
. We will obtain a single product distribution that places
low probability on both sets simultaneously by interpolating between these two distributions.
We use the fact that Lemma 9 yields graceful degradation in the quality of the threshold for
“low probability” as we perturb one coordinate of the product distribution at a time. If we
interpolate carefully, we can also ensure that the interpolated distribution we obtain is itself
induced by an acceptable window.
Lemma 14. Suppose the algorithm A satisfies measure one correctness and termination and
τ := e−
t2
8n . Then, for any reachable configuration σ not in Zk0 ∪Zk1 , there exist sets R,S1, . . . , Sn
that can be applied to σ such that the resulting reachable configuration falls outside Zk−1
0
∪Zk−1
1
with probability ≥ 1− 2e− (t−1)
2
8n .
Proof. Consider a reachable σ in the complement of Zk0 ∪ Zk1 . By definition of Zk0 , this means
there is some choice of R,S such that applying R,S, . . . , S to σ will avoid Zk−1
0
with probability
≥ 1−τ . Similarly, by definition of Zk1 , there is some choice R′, S′ such that applyingR′, S′, . . . , S′
to σ will avoid Zk−1
1
with probability ≥ 1− τ .
We assume without loss of generality that R′ = {1, 2, . . . , t′} for some t′ ≤ t. For each j
from 0 to n, we define the set Rj to be the union of R ∩ {1, 2, . . . , j} and R′ ∩ {j + 1, . . . , t′}.
We observe that |Rj| ≤ t for each j. We also define Sji := S for i ≤ j and Sji := S′ for i > j.
Then, for each j, we can apply Rj, S
j
1
, . . . , Sjn to σ to produce a new reachable configuration.
For each j, this induces a product distribution πj on the set of reachable configurations.
By construction, the distribution π0 places probability ≤ τ on Zk−11 and the distribution πn
places probability ≤ τ on Zk−1
0
. The first j coordinates of πj have the same distributions as in
πn, will the remaining coordinates have the same distribution as in π0. We define η := e
−
(t−1)2
8n .
We let j∗ denote the minimal value of j such that πj places probability ≤ η on Zk−10 . (Such a
j∗ exists since j = n satisfies this condition.) If j∗ = 0, then π0 then places probability ≤ η on
each of Zk−1
0
and Zk−1
1
. Otherwise, we argue as follows.
We use Pπj(A) for a set A to denote the probability that πj places on a set A. We claim
that:
Pπj∗
[
B
(
Zk−1
0
, 1
)]
≥ Pπj∗−1
[
Zk−1
0
]
. (1)
To see this, consider that the product distributions πj∗ and πj∗−1 only differ in a single coor-
dinate. Thus, if we sample a configuration according to πj∗−1 and obtain a result in Z
k−1
0
, we
can resample the differing coordinate to match πj∗ and we are guaranteed to obtain a result in
B
(
Zk−1
0
, 1
)
. The inequality (1) follows.
We observe that the set B(Zk−1
1
, t−1) is disjoint from the set B(Zk−1
0
, 1), since ∆(Zk−1
0
, Zk−1
1
) >
t. Hence,
1− Pπj∗
[
B
(
Zk−1
1
, t− 1
)]
≥ Pπj∗
[
B
(
Zk−1
0
, 1
)]
. (2)
Combining (1) and (2), we see that
Pπj∗
[
Zk−1
1
] (
1− Pπj∗
[
B
(
Zk−1
1
, t− 1
)])
≥ ηPπj∗
[
Zk−1
1
]
.
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Applying Lemma 9 and recalling the definition of η, we have
Pπj∗
[
Zk−1
1
]
≤ 1
η
e−
(t−1)2
4n = η.
We now have a product distribution πj∗ induced by an acceptable window that places
probability ≤ η on each set Zk−1
0
, Zk−1
1
, and hence Pπj∗
[
Zk−1
0
∪ Zk−1
1
]
≤ 2η, as required.
4.3 Proof of Theorem 5
We now employ the notation and lemmas of the previous subsections to prove Theorem 5. We
define α := c
2
9
and we define C sufficiently small such that
Ceαn ≤ 1
4
e
(cn−1)2
8n (3)
holds for all positive integers n. For convenience of notation, we define E := Ceαn.
We consider the sets ZE0 , Z
E
1 . By Lemma 13, we know that ∆
(
ZE0 , Z
E
1
)
> t. We consider
an initial configuration σ in which all input bits are set to 0. Then, it must be the case that
σ /∈ ZE1 . Otherwise, there would be a non-zero probability partial execution beginning with σ
and leading to a decision of 1, which contradicts measure one correctness. Similarly, an initial
configuration γ in which all input bits are set to 1 cannot belong to ZE0 . Hence, as we interpolate
between σ and γ, changing the input bit of one processors at a time, we must discover an initial
configuration δ such that δ /∈ ZE0 ∪ ZE1 . We fix this setting of the inputs.
Our strongly adaptive adversary is now defined as follows. Confronted with a partial execu-
tion resulting in a configuration σ, the adversary determines the maximum value of k ≤ E such
that σ /∈ Zk0 ∪Zk1 . If no such k exists, it continues arbitrarily within the constraint of producing
acceptable windows. If such a k does exist, then it applies the sequence of sets guaranteed by
Lemma 14 in order to yield a ≥ 1 − 2e− (cn−1)
2
8n probability of reaching a new configuration at
the end of the acceptable window that is not in Zk−1
0
∪ Zk−1
1
.
Since we begin with an initial configuration that is not in ZE0 ∪ZE1 , the probability that this
strongly adaptive adversary will succeed in causing ≥ E acceptable windows to occur before
any decision is made is at least:
1− 2Ee− (cn−1)
2
8n ≥ 1
2
,
recalling (3) and the definition of E. This completes our proof of Theorem 5.
5 Consequence for Resilience Against Crash Failures
The techniques developed to prove the exponential lower bound in the previous section have
implications beyond the strongly adaptive adversary. In fact, we can use the same techniques
(with a few minor modifications) to prove a lower bound for more traditional asynchronous
adversaries that applies to a large, natural class of algorithms. In particular, we consider an
asynchronous adversary (with unbounded computational power and knowledge of all messages
and internal states) that can cause up to t crash failures during an execution as well as controlling
the message scheduling. The only constraint on message delivery is that all messages sent must
eventually be delivered, if the recipient has not crashed.
We now define the crucial properties of an algorithm that are needed to apply our lower
bound techniques in this setting:
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Definition 15. We say an algorithm A is forgetful if each message sent by a processor depends
only on its input bit as well as messages received and local randomness sampled since the previous
sending event.
Intuitively, this means that processors do not “remember” prior events that are not reflected
by the most recently received messages. We define one more property of an algorithm that we
will require in conjunction with forgetfulness:
Definition 16. We say an algorithm A is fully communicative if whenever a processor receives
the most recently sent messages from n−t processors, it sends a new message to all n processors.
These properties are both present in the algorithms in [7, 10], and seem natural in the
context of crash failures, where one cannot wait for messages from t processors that may have
crashed. We will prove that our exponential lower bound extends to forgetful, fully commu-
nicative algorithms against an adversary able to cause ≤ t crash failures, making only minor
semantic modifications to the proof in Section 4. Intuitively, the combination of forgetfulness
and full communication mimics the effect of the resetting failures we previously considered.
Now processors are retaining old information forever in their state, but they are basing current
actions only on “recent” information, thereby proceeding as if they have forgotten the outdated
portions of their internal state.
In this context, we define a reachable configuration to be any configuration that occurs
with non-zero probability with at most t crash failures (note that we have dropped the notion
of acceptable windows). We analogously define measure one correctness and termination for
algorithms by requiring that all reachable configurations display only valid combinations of
input and output bits and that any infinite execution in which at most t crash failures occur
and all other processors take infinitely many sending and receiving steps has probability zero.
We will prove:
Theorem 17. We set t = cn where c > 0 is any fixed positive constant. Then there exist
absolute positive constants C,α (depending only on c) such that, for any fully communicative and
forgetful algorithm achieving measure one correctness and termination, there is an asynchronous
adversary and a setting of the inputs bits such that with probability ≥ 1
2
, the running time is
≥ Ceαn.
5.1 Definitions and Lemmas
We first adjust our definitions to obtain suitable sets Zk0 , Z
k
1 for this setting. Since there are no
longer any resets, we can assume without loss of generality that the local state of a processor
includes a log of all messages the processor has received and sent throughout the execution so
far. We will define all of our sets Zk0 , Z
k
1 to be subsets of reachable configurations containing
no crashed processors. We will rely on the fully communicative nature of the algorithm to
additionally restrict to reachable configurations in which all processors are ready to send to all
other processors.
Given a reachable configuration σ and sets S1, . . . , Sn all of size ≥ n−t, we say the adversary
applies these sets to σ to mean that the adversary executes the following sequence of steps.
First, all processors taking sending steps. Then, each processor i receives the messages just
sent to it from the processors in Si (in some fixed order). Note that when the algorithm is fully
communicative, beginning from an initial configuration and repeatedly applying such n-tuples
of sets will result in every processor sending to every other processor in each sending step.
Now, analogously to the definitions in Section 4.2, we define:
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Definition 18. We let Z00 denote the set of reachable configurations in Σ
n such that at least
one processor has written 0 to its output bit. Similarly, we let Z01 denote the set of reachable
configurations in Σn such that at least one processor has written 1 to its output bit.
Definition 19. For k ≥ 1, we let Zk0 denote the set of reachable configurations in Σn where all
processors are poised to send messages to all other processors and for any set |S| ≥ n − t, the
adversary applying S, S, . . . , S to the configuration will result in a new configuration that belongs
to Zk−1
0
with probability > τ . Similarly, we let Zk1 denote the set of reachable configurations in
Σn such that, for any |S| ≥ n − t, the adversary applying S, S, . . . , S to the configuration will
result in a new configuration that belongs to Zk−1
1
with probability > τ .
We then have:
Lemma 20. If a fully communicative and forgetful algorithm A satisfies measure one correct-
ness and termination and τ ≥ e− t
2
8n , then ∆
(
Zk0 , Z
k
1
)
> t for all non-negative integers k.
Proof. We first establish the base case, i.e. that ∆
(
Z00 , Z
0
1
)
> t. This is similar to the proof of
Lemma 11.
We suppose there exist reachable configurations σ, γ ∈ Σn such that σ ∈ Z00 , γ ∈ Z01 , and
∆(σ, γ) ≤ t. Without loss of generality, we suppose that σ and γ only differ in the first t
coordinates (i.e. only in the local states of processors 1 through t). We let S denote the set
{t+ 1, . . . , n}.
Consider a non-zero probability partial execution that results in configuration σ. We can
define another non-zero probability partial execution by executing most of the same steps, but
crashing each of the first t processors before they send any messages that are not sent in a partial
execution resulting in γ. In other words, we reach a new configuration δ that agrees with σ, γ
in the final n− t coordinates, and the steps taken by the first t processors in δ are precisely the
common steps taken by these processors in both σ, γ: at the point where the actions of these
processors diverge in σ and γ, the processors are crashed.
Now δ is reachable, and the adversary can continue a partial execution from δ by continually
executing sending and receiving steps among the final n − t processors. Since the algorithm
A satisfies measure one termination, if the adversary keeps extending this execution, with
probability one a decision must eventually be reached. Let’s suppose that this decision is 1 with
non-zero probability. Then the same extension can be applied to a partial execution reaching
σ and this will yield conflicting decisions with non-zero probability, contradicting measure one
correctness. Similarly, if the decision reached from extending δ is 0 with probability 1, then a
partial execution reaching γ can be extended to yield conflicting decisions. We may conclude
that ∆(Z00 , Z
0
1 ) > t.
We now proceed by induction on k (similarly to the proof of Lemma 13). We assume
the result holds for k − 1 ≥ 0, and we suppose it is false for k. Then there exist reachable
configurations σ, γ ∈ Σn such that σ ∈ Zk0 , γ ∈ Zk1 , and ∆(σ, γ) ≤ t. Without loss of generality,
we suppose that σ and γ only differ in the first t coordinates. We let S denote the set {t+1, t+
2, . . . , n}. By definition of Zk0 , if the adversary applies S, . . . , S to σ, this will with probability
> τ result in a new configuration belonging to Zk−1
0
. If the adversary applies S, . . . , S to γ, this
will with probability > τ result in a new configuration belonging to Zk−1
1
.
We first consider the case where no output bits have yet been written in σ or γ. By the
forgetful and fully communicative properties of the algorithm, the distributions of the configu-
rations resulting from applying S, . . . , S to σ and to γ only differ in portions of the local state
that can no longer affect behavior of the processors going forward. This is because the new
messages to be sent by all n processors will only depend on the input bits and the newly received
n − t messages, not the prior portions of the state that differed between γ and σ. Hence, the
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product distribution induced by applying S, . . . , S to γ places weight > τ of each of two sets,
Zk−1
0
and Zk−1
1
, that are separated by a Hamming distance > t. Applying Lemma 9, we thus
have that
τ2 < e−
t2
4n ⇔ τ < e− t
2
8n .
This contradicts our stipulation on the value of τ .
In the case that an output bit has already been written as 0 in σ, say, then we reach a
contradiction by repeatedly applying S, . . . , S to σ. Since γ ∈ Zk1 , there is a nonzero probability
that this results in a decision of 1 by processors outside of the first t, since these are unaffected
by the first t processor states when these processors are no longer heard.
Lemma 21. Suppose a fully communicative and forgetful algorithm A satisfies measure one
correctness and termination and τ := e−
t2
8n . Then, for any reachable configuration σ not in
Zk0 ∪ Zk1 , there exist sets S1, . . . , Sn that can be applied to σ such that the resulting reachable
configuration falls outside Zk−1
0
∪ Zk−1
1
with probability ≥ 1− 2e− (t−1)
2
8n .
Proof. This is essentially the same as the proof of Lemma 14, but we restate the argument
for completeness. Consider a reachable σ in the complement of Zk0 ∪ Zk1 . By definition of Zk0 ,
this means there is some choice of S such that applying S, . . . , S to σ will avoid Zk−1
0
with
probability ≥ 1 − τ . Similarly, by definition of Zk1 , there is some choice S′ such that applying
S′, . . . , S′ to σ will avoid Zk−1
1
with probability ≥ 1− τ .
We define Sji := S for i ≤ j and Sji := S′ for i > j. Then, for each j, we can apply Sj1, . . . , Sjn
to σ to produce a new reachable configuration. For each j, this induces a product distribution
πj on the set of reachable configurations.
By construction, the distribution π0 places probability ≤ τ on Zk−11 and the distribution πn
places probability ≤ τ on Zk−1
0
. The first j coordinates of πj have the same distributions as in
πn, while the remaining coordinates have the same distribution as in π0. We define η := e
−
(t−1)2
8n .
We let j∗ denote the minimal value of j such that πj places probability ≤ η on Zk−10 . (Such a
j∗ exists since j = n satisfies this condition.) If j∗ = 0, then π0 then places probability ≤ η on
each of Zk−1
0
and Zk−1
1
. Otherwise, we argue as follows.
We use Pπj(A) for a set A to denote the probability that πj places on a set A. We claim
that:
Pπj∗
[
B
(
Zk−1
0
, 1
)]
≥ Pπj∗−1
[
Zk−1
0
]
. (4)
To see this, consider that the product distributions πj∗ and πj∗−1 only differ in a single coor-
dinate. Thus, if we sample a configuration according to πj∗−1 and obtain a result in Z
k−1
0
, we
can resample the differing coordinate to match πj∗ and we are guaranteed to obtain a result in
B
(
Zk−1
0
, 1
)
. The inequality (4) follows.
We observe that the set B(Zk−1
1
, t−1) is disjoint from the set B(Zk−1
0
, 1), since ∆(Zk−1
0
, Zk−1
1
) >
t. Hence,
1− Pπj∗
[
B
(
Zk−1
1
, t− 1
)]
≥ Pπj∗
[
B
(
Zk−1
0
, 1
)]
. (5)
Combining (4) and (5), we see that
Pπj∗
[
Zk−1
1
] (
1− Pπj∗
[
B
(
Zk−1
1
, t− 1
)])
≥ ηPπj∗
[
Zk−1
1
]
.
Applying Lemma 9, we have
Pπj∗
[
Zk−1
1
]
≤ 1
η
e−
(t−1)2
4n = η.
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We now have a product distribution πj∗ induced by applying a sequence of sets of size ≥ n−t
that places probability ≤ η on each set Zk−1
0
, Zk−1
1
, and hence Pπj∗
[
Zk−1
0
∪ Zk−1
1
]
≤ 2η, as
required.
5.2 Proof of Theorem 17
We define α,C,E as in Section 4.3 and consider the sets ZE0 , Z
E
1 as defined above. There must
be an initial configuration δ such that δ /∈ ZE0 ∪ ZE1 . We fix this setting of the inputs.
Beginning with δ, the adversary proceeds as follows. It first applies the sequence of sets
guaranteed by Lemma 21 in order to yield a ≥ 1 − 2e− (cn−1)
2
8n probability of reaching a new
configuration that is not in ZE−1
0
∪ ZE−1
1
. If it succeeds, it can then apply a new sequence of
sets (again furnished by Lemma 21) in order to yield a ≥ 1− 2e− cn−1)
2
8n probability of reaching
a new configuration that is not in ZE−2
0
∪ ZE−2
1
, and so on.
The probability that this adversary will succeed in causing ≥ E such iterations to occur
before any decision is made is at least:
1− 2Ee− (cn−1)
2
8n ≥ 1
2
,
recalling (3) and the definition of E. By the fully communicative property, we know that in
each iteration, every processor will send a message to every other processor. This guarantees a
message chain of length E. This completes our proof of Theorem 17.
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